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Over the last decades, there has been plenty of research and articles on Political Business 
Cycles (PBC), aiming at analyzing and explaining the use of fiscal and monetary 
instruments to stimulate economic growth before elections, to impress the voters.  
Following other researches for PBC in Albania, in which there was found clear evidence 
of fiscal expansion before elections, but no significant changes in inflation and GDP, as 
theory predicts, we analyze the peoples’ expectations related to elections outcomes, and 
the way these expectations influence their decisions to spend, and consequently the 
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“It is pretty generally accepted that the popularity of political parties at election time is 
related to business conditions” (Tibbitts, 1931, p. 596). It is obvious that the economic 
performance of a government determines to a large extent its likelihood of reelection, and 
therefore the economic factors influence political factors and in turn, incumbent may 
manipulate economy in an attempt to attract votes. 
Over the last decades, there has been plenty of research and articles published on Political 
Business Cycles (PBC), aiming at analyzing and explaining the use of fiscal and 
monetary instruments by the incumbent to stimulate economic growth before elections, to 
impress the voters. The government may behave opportunistically and inefficiently prior 
to elections engaging in expansionary economic policies, to increase the output and 
decrease unemployment, in order to please the voters, however, creating Political 
Business Cycles. Researchers have also investigated how the economic performance 
influences elections outcomes; nevertheless, this approach is not subject of our research. 
There has been only one research paper written on Political Business Cycles in Albania 
(Imami and Lami, 2008). According to it, there is clear evidence of Political Cycles in 
Fiscal instruments but no in Monetary ones. Interestingly, the significant increase of 
public expenditures and other fiscal instruments prior to elections did not lead to that 
significant change in inflation and output, as predicted by economic theory. There could 
be several reasons and explanations. One possible explanation is that the transmission 
mechanisms do not reflect on time changes and signals in the economy. Another 
explanation might be the possible existence of other phenomena in the economy, which 
offset the effects, generated by changes in policies, but are not directly affected by them. 
This very second hypothesis motivated us to conduct further research, which may through    H. Kächelein, D. Imami, E. Lami  2
new light into PBC theory and empirics. Our main focus lays thereby on the consumer 
expenditures, to identify possible variations related to elections and the reasons behind 
them. Thus, the objective of our research is to investigate on other aspects of Political 
Business Cycles in Albania, whose results might be applicable in other transition and 
development countries. We analyze data of retail trade index at quarterly level, between 
first quarter 1999 and last quarter 2007. The period prior 1999 was not taken into 
consideration because of the lack of reliable data. During the analyzed period there took 
place two parliamentary elections, namely June 24, 2001 and July 3, 2005. 
After a short overview concerning the political business cycle theory and the existing 
empirical results in the upcoming chapter, the guiding theoretical background will be 
presented in chapter three together with the empirical part of the paper. 
2. PBC Theory and Empirical Background 
The phenomena of manipulation of the economy by the incumbent for electoral purpose, 
is called Political Business Cycles (PBC), introduced by Nordhaus (1975). Using 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies,  incumbent politicians manipulate the 
economy to gain electoral advantage by producing a pre-election boom with associated 
with a reduced unemployment rate. In the upcoming election, myopic voters support the 
leading party as it was able to present it self as a successful economic leader creating a 
greater economic well-being. Meanwhile, the assumption of a short run Philips curve 
leads to higher inflation delayed to the period after the election, while politicians returned 
already to a more contractionary stance.  
This PBC model opened the way for many following empirical and theoretical studies 
and publications and remains a point of reference. One of the most interesting PBC 
research works was done by Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini. They analyzed data of 
three recent decades of 18 OECD countries investigating the relation between main 
macroeconomic variables and elections results (Alesina, Roubini, 1992). According to 
this study, there was no evidence of Opportunistic PBC of the Nordhaus type, either for 
output or for unemployment, except for two countries (Germany and New Zealand). 
However, the data showed electoral cycle on the inflation rate.    A new view into Political Business Cycles: Household Expenditures in Albania  3
Evidence of PBC was also found in less developed and democratic countries. Gimpelsen 
(2001) made a research on the existence of PBC in Russia, finding evidence in support of 
it. Another study of Asutay (2004) provided clear evidence for the presence of PBC in 
Turkey. The incumbent in Turkey has used fiscal and monetary policy instruments to 
create PBC in order to improve the chances of being reelected. Also our previous 
research on the existence of Political Business Cycles in Albania indicated that the 
incumbent manipulate fiscal instruments, increasing public expenditures before elections.  
There may be several explanations for the limited empirical support for the Nordhaus 
Opportunistic PBC on growth and unemployment. First of all, “rational voters” 
assumption limits such an approach, and therefore the policymakers, knowing this fact, 
do not try to generate Opportunistic PBC policies. Second, it is not an easy task to 
generate expansions well calculated and timed for elections (Alesina, Roubini, 1992). 
Third, which might be the case of development and transition economies, there may 
occur other economic phenomena, which could offset the effect of the increased public 
expenditures in outcome variables (output, unemployment, inflation, etc.), which we 
intend to address in our research.  
3. Searching for cycles in private and households sectors 
expenditures 
3.1  Background of the hypothesis 
The Albanian public sector still employs a relatively high number of people, only about 
20 percent less than the non-agriculture private sector (Worldbank 2006). The public 
administration remains substantially politicized, and often appointments of public 
servants are politically based (it is hard to find accurate figures in support of this 
phenomenon). According to Mjaft (2006) an Albanian NGO, 14074 employees have been 
fired from the public administration within about a year after the political rotation of year 
2005 and, more specifically, about 80 % of the employees of the line ministries have been 
fired. Similar politicized waves of employments and firings have taken place also after 
the political rotation of 1992 and 1997. Thus, it is expected, that if there will be a rotation 
of political power, many public employees will loose their jobs. The following classical    H. Kächelein, D. Imami, E. Lami  4
period of a frictional unemployment will be very longer in an economic environment of 
officially 17 percent and estimated 30 percent of unemployment.   
This high risk of unemployment may imply a significant increase in private savings 
before elections. Based on the permanent income hypothesis, the actual consumption 
depends also on the financial situation in future periods. For the special case of transition 
countries, we have also to take into account the special situation of high uncertainty 
concerning the economic situation in the upcoming years. Therefore, it seems to be 
adequate to assume a relatively high discount rate concerning future income. Based on 
this, the consumption decision depends mainly on the actual income and the expected 
income for the upcoming period. Households being affected by such political change as 
described as before, will tend save more and spend less in the months or quarters before 
elections, preparing for a longer period of unemployment and consequently affecting the 
aggregate demand and expenditures of the household sector.  
3.2  Variables and Data specifications 
We expect and will attempt to empirically test that the households, facing an increased 
uncertainty prior to election, will decrease their consumption expenditures, offsetting in 
this way the effects of other opportunistically manipulated incumbents’ instruments on 
the final macroeconomic outcomes. To test the “household consumption” hypothesis we 
will use and investigate the volume Retail Trade Index (RTI) as an approximate indicator 
of the household consumption behavior in Albania
*. We will statistically test for a change 
(a reduction is expected) in the RTI. The RTI time series is in a quarterly basis, spanning 
from Q1-1999 to Q4-2007, adding up to 36 observations. There are two parliamentary 
elections taking place in this period, namely June 24, 2001 and July 3, 2005. 
 
                                                 
* There are no final private consumption estimations in a quarterly or higher level of frequency for Albania. 
The Retail Trade Index is estimated and published by the Institute of Statistics of Albania (INSTAT).   A new view into Political Business Cycles: Household Expenditures in Albania  5
3.3  Specifications of empirical tests 
Following the standard approach in this area,
† we will apply the Intervention Analysis 
based on Box & Tiao (1975), a methodology for constructing a statistical model in our 
study. In this paper we test the hypothesis of the existence of changes in the retail trade 
index. Basically the test proceeds by subjecting the quarterly seasonally adjusted time 
series of these variables to a Box-Tiao intervention analysis using the most appropriate 
autoregressive-moving average (ARIMA) for the social process and an intervention term; 
here the intervention term models the time distance to the election day.  
A simple formal representation of the intervention analysis is: 
t t t N I z + + = μ  
where  μ   denotes the mean level, the term It  denotes the intervention effect and Nt 
denotes the noise of the time series which is modeled using a suitable ARMA(p,q) model, 
q t p t t p t p t t E E E N N N − − − − + + − + + + = θ θ φ φ ... ... 1 1 1 1  
where Et denotes an independent error sequence.  
The simplest, which corresponds to the t-test in a non-time series setting, is the 
Intervention term/variable, which in this case takes the form of a Pulse Intervention, 
meaning an abrupt jump in the series and then a gradual decline at the normal level of the 
series. Formally the pulse intervention term can be expressed as:  
() T
t t P I 0 ω =  
where  () T















The parameter  0 ω  measures the change caused by the intervention and is estimated along 
with the ARIMA time series component. The estimation procedure provides an estimate 
                                                 
† See for example McCallum (1978), Hibbs (1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988), Alesina and Roubini (1992). 
Hibbs (1977) offers a good introduction to the Box-Tiao technique. 
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of  0 ω  and a confidence interval for the parameter. In our case the, dependent variable zt is 
the Retail Trade Index that is assumed to be affected because of elections. The 
intervention variable It is expressed as a binary variable (dummy variable) indicating a 
specific time prior to election, as shown below. And the noise component of each specific 
dependent variable, Nt, is modeled by an appropriate ARIMA (p,d,q) found by following 
Box-Jenkins (BJ) Methodology (1970) as explained in more detail below. 
We have created two kinds of political dummy variables (It) to capture the impact of the 
elections retail index, namely cumulative dummy and discrete dummy, each of which 
used for different purposes as explained in the section 3.5 (Empirical results) of this 
paper. 
Note: For convenience we have denote  () T
t P with PDi standing for Political Dummy 
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and so on for the PD4d, PD5d and PD6d 
3.4  Estimation of the empirical model 
In the first stage, we have followed precisely the Box-Jenkins (BJ) Methodology (1970). 
In the beginning of the process, the first step was removing the seasonal patterns form the 
time series. The seasonal adjustments are computed with the help of DEMETRA 
software
‡. Next we carefully investigate on the stationary of the time series as a necessity 
in further steps. Formally applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test and also 
visually judging on the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function correlograms 
the RTI seasonally adjusted time series appeared to be a non-stationary one. To transform 
it in a stationary time series we tried the approach of an n order difference transformation 
on the original seasonal adjusted series. In this case, after the first order difference the 
obtained time series resulted from all the relevant tests to be stationary
§.  
Based on Box-Tiao’s (1975) intervention analysis, after ensuring for the stationarity, the 
time-series is modeled as ARMA  (Auto-Regressive Moving Averages). By modeling 
through ARMA it is possible to prove if elections can explain the changes taking place in 
household expenditures, in addition to the past history of the variable and the random 
error term. Hence, it is necessary the identification of ARMA (p,q) benchmark model. To 
find the “best” ARMA model for each time series we are straightforwardly based on Box-
Jenkins methodology (1970). Hence, in order to model the RTI time series as an ARMA 
we went thought an iterative process of identification, estimation and diagnostic checking 
of several ARMA models until we found the most plausible one, deemed as the “best” for 
each series
**.  
In the second stage we individually incorporated each of the political dummy variables in 
the ARMA model tentatively found in the first stage and re-estimated the whole model 
                                                 
‡ DEMETRA is a standard software used by EUROSTAT to seasonally adjust every kind of EU figures. 
§ The n order difference is a strongly recommended efficient approach in most of the literature of 
transforming one time series from non-stationary to a stationary one 
** Gujarati (2003) makes a simple and clear explanation of the Box – Jenkins Methodology 
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now with an additional incorporated PDi aiming at capturing the possible impact of 
elections on retail sales and test whether elections has any impact on the econometric 
time-series utilized by this study in addition to variable’s past value and its respective 
error term. Thus, the impact of elections is considered to be an intervention or shock in 
the determination of the value of the variable (RTI) by forcing the value of the variable to 
shift during the intervention or shock periods. The statistical significance of the political 
dummy variables is tested using t-test. Consequently, if the coefficient of the political 
dummy variable is statistically significant and has the expected negative sign we can 
conclude that households spend less before elections. 
3.5 Empirical  Results   
We deseasonalized the original series, and than we obtained the first difference of the 
seasonally adjusted series, which was stationary. The “best” ARIMA model tentatively 
found appeared to be an ARIMA (2,0,0). 
After including one at the time all the cumulative PD in the model and re-estimating the 
econometric model, now expressed by an ARMA (2,0) plus a cumulative PDi, it resulted 
that almost all the cumulative dummy variables prior elections have a negative sign as 
expected, and are statistically significant, except for the PD1 and PD6. PD1 is still 
negative in sing but significant only at 12.5 percent level of significance. Whereas, all the 
other variables (PD2, PD3, PD4 and PD5) have a negative sign and are significant at a 
significance level of less than 5 percent.    A new view into Political Business Cycles: Household Expenditures in Albania  9
Table 1.  Seasonally adjusted – first order difference Retail Trade Index in parliamentary 
elections (cumulative PD) 
Model Type  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
ARIMA(2,0,0)  Coeff.  Sig.  Coeff. Sig.  Coeff. Sig.  Coeff. Sig.  Coeff. Sig.  Coeff. Sig. 
Constant  4.923  0.006  6.494 0.000 6.220 0.001 6.861 0.000 6.385 0.002  4.428 0.015
RTI-diff_1 (AR 2)  -0.402  0.020  -0.546 0.001 -0.444 0.009 -0.435 0.013 -0.429 0.013 -0.390 0.027
PD1  -13.965  0.125                              
PD2**        -20.371 0.001                       
PD3**              -11.997 0.015                 
PD4**                    -11.704 0.007           
PD5*                          -7.753 0.051      
PD6                                -5.560 0.557
Diagnostic tests 
Stationary  
R-squared  0.209  0.377 0.290 0.332 0.245  0.158
R-squared  0.209  0.377 0.290 0.332 0.245  0.158
RMSE  12.806  11.365 12.130 11.767 12.514  13.216
MAPE  438.694  511.762 418.349 499.633 424.846  397.633
MaxAPE  3958.031  5770.019 5240.594 5812.474 5354.742  3493.412
MAE  8.956  8.086 8.737 8.801 9.258  9.275
MaxMAE  29.984  30.879 30.084 30.970 30.264  32.662
Normalized BIC  5.405  5.166 5.296 5.235 5.358  5.468
Ljung-Box  18.262  23.864 21.322 20.987 18.047  15.082
* significant at 10 % level of confidence 
** significant at  5 % level of confidence 
 
In order to investigate for the intensity of the contracting behavior in household 
consumption as the elections come closer and closer, we employed the six discrete 
dummy variables (PDid), defined in the previous section. We introduced into the 
ARMA(2,0) model all the six PDid simultaneously and re-estimated the model. All the 
coefficients of these variables had the expected negative sign, and their size was 
increasing closer to elections. Almost all of coefficients, except of PD3d and PD5d were 
significant. To obtain more robust result we excluded from the model the two dummy 
variables that were not significant (3 and 5) and re-estimated the model. Again all 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant at a ten percent level of significance    H. Kächelein, D. Imami, E. Lami  10
or less and the coefficients follow a quasi monotonically increasing order in absolute 
terms.  
Their ordinal relation in absolute terms is: PD6d > PD4d > PD2d < PD1d 
Table 2.  Seasonally adjusted – first order difference Retail Trade Index in parliamentary 
elections (discrete PD) 
Model Type  Model 1 
ARIMA(2,0,0)  Coeff.  Sig. 
Constant  5.822 0.000 
RTI-diff_1 (AR 2)  -0.554 0.001 
PD1**  -15.891 0.037 
PD2**  -16.368 0.050 
PD4*     -14.354 0.099 
PD6**  17.143 0.041 
Diagnostic tests 







Normalized BIC  5.384
Ljung-Box  27.377
* significant at 10 % level of confidence 
** significant at  5 % level of confidence 
 
It is obvious that the closer to the Election Day, the lower is the final consumption. The 
results are robust, as most coefficients are significant at 5% level of confidence.  
4. Conclusions  
Before elections, the incumbent increases public expenditures, aiming at stimulating 
temporarily economics growth to impress voters. However, output is not affected by 
fiscal policies only, but also from other factors, outside the incumbent control, such as the 
decision of the households to spend. The possible political rotation may be associated 
with loss of jobs by a substantial number of people in the public administration, which is   A new view into Political Business Cycles: Household Expenditures in Albania 11
a key employer. In turn, potentially affected people may decide to reduce their 
expenditures, preparing for hard times. Judging on this results and on diagnostic statistics 
of the models estimations, we have enough empirical evidence to conclude that prior to 
elections there is a contraction in retail trade and by implication in the final consumption 
and consequently in the Output (Gross Domestic Product) of the economy. The reduced 
household expenditures may offset the effect of increased public expenditures before 
elections, keeping output and inflation relatively constant.     H. Kächelein, D. Imami, E. Lami  12
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